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Fw: The End of Chat Control is an Opportunity: 5-Point Action Plan for Genuine Child Protection
by uvdfri 09 Apr '26

09 Apr '26

Läsvärt om child protection ------- Forwarded Message ------- Från: Press Patrick Breyer (PIRATES) via DFRI-intern <dfri-intern(a)lists.dfri.se> Datum: Den fredag 3 april 2026 kl. 14:49 Ämne: The End of Chat Control is an Opportunity: 5-Point Action Plan for Genuine Child Protection Till: dfri(a)dfri.se <dfri(a)dfri.se> > PRESS RELEASE > > The End of Chat Control is an Opportunity: 5-Point Action Plan for Genuine Child Protection > > Tomorrow, April 3, EU Regulation 2021/1232 will expire. This controversial regulation allowed US tech companies to scan private messages without suspicion or a judicial warrant (commonly known as "Chat Control"). To mark this occasion, civil rights activist and former Member of the European Parliament, Dr. Patrick Breyer, presents a 5-Point Action Plan for effective child protection by EU governments. Featuring statements from survivors of abuse, the core message is clear: The end of mass surveillance must mark the beginning of genuine protective measures. > > Dr. Patrick Breyer, former Member of the European Parliament, explains: > “The end of indiscriminate Chat Control is not a setback, but an opportunity for genuine child protection. Trying to protect children with mass surveillance is like desperately mopping the floor while leaving the faucet running. Untargeted bulk Chat Control is as unacceptable as indiscriminately opening everyone's postal mail—and accordingly, it would never have stood up in court. For four years, this failed system served as an alibi to delay real measures, instead overwhelming police forces with false alarms and duplicates. These excuses are now obsolete. Our action plan demonstrates that we need more child protection, not less—but we need effective protection, not a false sense of security.” > > The Myth of the "Protection Gap": What actually changes—and what doesn't > > - What ends: US providers are no longer allowed to scan unencrypted private messages without suspicion and without a warrant. This affects direct messages on platforms like Instagram, Discord, Snapchat, Skype, and Microsoft’s Xbox, as well as emails via Google's Gmail and Apple's iCloud. > - What remains: Public posts on social media and files in cloud storage can still be scanned. Private messages can still be reported by users or intercepted via lawful, warrant-based telecommunications surveillance. > - What was never scanned anyway: Encrypted chats, such as those on WhatsApp, were already exempt from scanning. Furthermore, European messenger and email providers have never practiced Chat Control. > - What the numbers say: Due to the increasing encryption of direct messages, the number of US suspicion-based reports has already [dropped by 50% since 2022](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0740). According to these EU Commission figures, the end of Chat Control could reduce this by another 36% (the share of private messages in all reports in 2024). Of the incoming reports, statistics from the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) show that [48%](https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/SexualdeliktezNvKindernuJugendlichen/BLBSexualdeliktezNvKindernuJugendlichen2024.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2) are not criminally relevant from the outset. Furthermore, German crime statistics reveal that 40% of the resulting investigations target children and teenagers themselves (e.g., consensual sexting). An estimated 99% of the material reported by Meta under Chat Control was already known to authorities, making it virtually useless for stopping ongoing, new abuse. The EU Commission has been [unable](https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/SexualdeliktezNvKindernuJugendlichen/BLBSexualdeliktezNvKindernuJugendlichen2024.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2) to provide any evidence that indiscriminate scanning of private communications has resulted in more convictions. > > There is no "protection gap": The most effective tools—warrant-based telecommunications surveillance, user reports, and the scanning of public content and cloud storage—remain fully intact. The only thing that ends is the suspicionless searching of private, unencrypted messages of unsuspected citizens by a few US companies. > > Just weeks ago, Europol’s "[Operation Alice](https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/news/global-cybercrime-crackdown-over-373-000-dark-web-sites-shut-down)" successfully shut down over 373,000 pedocriminal dark web sites and identified hundreds of suspects globally. This monumental strike against CSAM networks was achieved entirely without mass scanning private citizen chats. It relied on what actually works: international cooperation, server seizures, and targeted cyber-investigations. > > Breyer: "Portraying the end of indiscriminate Chat Control as a disaster for child protection confuses mass surveillance with actual protection. The previous system flooded investigators with hundreds of thousands of largely irrelevant reports, triggered criminal proceedings against children, and left the images of victims circulating untouched on the Darknet. Now is the time to establish child protection measures that are effective and compliant with the rule of law. It is up to EU governments to implement this action plan." > > The Voices of Survivors: "We need privacy to bring abusers to justice" > > Survivors of sexual violence explicitly emphasize that untargeted Chat Control did not help victims: > > Alexander Hanff, survivor of child sexual abuse and privacy advocate, clarifies: > "As a survivor I relied on confidential communications to tell my story and find justice for 28 schoolboys—myself included—resulting in the conviction of multiple offenders. We survivors need privacy, because without it we lose our voice. Chat Control was not created to protect children. It was about Big Tech companies like Meta or Google wanting access to our data for profiteering, and states attempting to expand mass surveillance. The EU Commission has wasted five years and millions of euros on algorithms that cannot protect children and were never meant to. This money should have been diverted to real policing, causal research, and support for survivors, millions of whom have never received any support at all." > > Marcel Schneider* (name changed), a survivor who has been [suing Meta in court over its voluntary Chat Control](https://freiheitsrechte.org/en/ueber-die-gff/presse/pressemitteilu…, adds: > “Anyone mourning the end of Chat Control today has not understood what actually helps survivors of sexual violence. Mass surveillance by corporations like Meta does not prevent abuse. Genuine protection means: deleting material at the source, proactive police work on the Darknet, and apps that are safe by design for children from the very start.” > > 5-Point Action Plan for Genuine, Lawful Child Protection > > 1. Delete instead of looking away – Use freed-up police capacity for the systematic deletion of abuse material > For years, police authorities across Europe have [refused to systematically report depictions of child sexual abuse in pedocriminal Darknet forums for removal](https://netzpolitik.org/2022/depictions-of-child-abuse-the-interne…, citing a lack of personnel—even though two journalists recently demonstrated that this is possible with minimal staff and can shut down entire forums. With the end of voluntary Chat Control, the flood of tens of thousands of irrelevant or already-known reports from the US, which previously tied up investigators, will decrease. EU Member States must now deploy these freed-up capacities for what survivors have been demanding for years and what has been proven to work: the proactive, systematic search for known CSAM in Darknet forums and on publicly accessible websites—and its removal at the source to stop the ongoing abuse of victims. > > 2. Safe from the start – Security by Design for Apps > Tech companies must stop shifting responsibility onto algorithms. Apps must be designed to protect users from unwanted contact by strangers. By default, profiles must not be publicly visible, contact from strangers must be blocked, nude images must be blurred, and users must be warned before sharing personal data. This is necessary to technically prevent grooming and harassment. EU governments need to support these proposals made by the European Parliament in the ongoing CSAR trilogue negotiations. > > 3. Strengthen law enforcement: Quality over Quantity > Instead of paralyzing police forces with tens of thousands of false or previously known hits from US corporations, investigations must be professionalized: > > - Lawful, targeted instruments: Targeted but mandatory suspicion-based searches of private communications, strictly based on a judicial warrant, must be introduced in line with the European Parliament's position. Just as police may only search a home with a warrant, the scanning of private messages must only be possible upon concrete suspicion and by judicial order. If EU governments in the Council do not give up their resistance to this targeted, lawful approach and continue to cling to the failed instrument of voluntary mass scanning, the ongoing trilogue negotiations for the permanent child protection regulation risk derailing and failing. > - Technology and Personnel: Anyone serious about child protection must invest in investigative capacities. EU Member States should provide: specialized and sufficient personnel, modern technology for data analysis, centralized evaluation units, mandatory training, and centralized monitoring of case progress and capacities. Undercover online investigations against perpetrator networks must be expanded to stop ongoing abuse and the flood of new material at the source. > > 4. Prevention in schools: Nationwide distribution of "Digital Self-Defense" materials > Children must be empowered to recognize abusers early and protect themselves online. As an immediate measure, a "Prevention Kit" should be distributed to high school students, teaching them in an age-appropriate way how to recognize grooming. Crucial tips for digital self-defense include: never trusting the claimed identity of strangers, never sharing location or phone numbers, never meeting an online contact alone, and reporting abusive messages instead of responding to them. According to a [poll](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chatcontrol-survey-children-dont-want-to-be-protected-by-scanning-or-age-restricting-messenger-and-chat-apps/), 43% of children suggest that improving media literacy and training minors on risks and appropriate responses is the most effective approach to protect them from harm on the Internet. > > 5. Anchor protection concepts locally in real life > Abuse happens in the real world. We demand the mandatory introduction of safeguarding concepts in all organizations where children spend time—schools, daycare centers, churches, sports clubs, clinics, and youth camps. > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Background: EU Transition Regulation 2021/1232, in effect since 2021, allowed messenger, email, and chat services to voluntarily scan private communications for potential CSAM (Child Sexual Abuse Material) without suspicion and without a judicial warrant. In March 2026, the European Parliament voted against extending it. Negotiations between the Council and Parliament on a permanent successor regulation (CSAR, or "Chat Control 2.0") are ongoing and expected to conclude by summer. > >> > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > > You are receiving this press release because you are on our contact list. To unsubscribe, please reply with "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. > > -- > Dr. Patrick Breyer > Former Member of the European Parliament for the German Pirate Party > E-Mail: > europa(a)patrick-breyer.de > My PGP key: > http://keys.gnupg.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x774EC7FD4E3C9B04

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DFRI Styrelsemöte Styrelsemöte tisdag14 april 2026 (online)
by Börje Ohlman 09 Apr '26

09 Apr '26

DFRI håller ett öppet styrelsemöte tisdag14 april 2026, kl 18:00 på Internet. Vi beräknas hålla på i ungefär en timme. Alla medlemmar och andra intresserade är välkomna. Dagordning finns på: https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/M5EzQVZisELAEgYZydNgrhFxsHJXjB+ZxMO-wQ… Den kommer att uppdateras fram till dess. Anmäl dig gärna per mejl till dfri(a)dfri.se <mailto:dfri@dfri.se> om du vill delta. I ditt mejl kan du även föreslå saker som du vill ska tas upp på mötet. Möteslänk: http://public-meet2.glesys.com/DFRI-styr-2026 Börje

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Re: Kontrollen tilltar
by Emilio 04 Apr '26

04 Apr '26

Jag installerar aurora store via F-droid och sen BankID och playstore appar om de nu blir ett måste. Aurora store är en play store spegel (mirror) MvH, Emilio Müller 1 Apr 2026 16:19:22 Name <njacobsson-f(a)tutanota.com>: > Hej > Tack för detta. Jag har uppfattat detta så också. Det jag tänker på är om till exempel bankid (en rysare att den har så stor förankring i Sverige) endast finns tillgängligt på google play (andra bibliotek som f-droid är det bara underkända versioner. Man undrar också vad som kan komma att hända med Signal? Alltför få använder F-droid och misstror andra alternativ än Google när det borde vara tvärtom. Vi får väl se vad som händer. > Jag använder e/OS och är mycket nöjd med det så det känns ju bra. > Sen kan jag tycka att detta stryper innovationen och glädjen med fria och öppna system i apputvecklingen, något som jag anser är skälet till fria samhällens framgångar. Det behöver värnas om. > Stater kan strypa innovation som tex Kina med kontroll men det kan företag som är stora som stater också. > /Niclas > -- > Säkrad med Tuta Mail: > https://tuta.com/free-email > > > 1 apr. 2026 15:02 av emiliomuller(a)autistici.org: > >> Hejsan Niclas!> >> >> Såvitt jag vet så gäller inte detta problem på de-googled ROMs såsom GrapheneOS och om man väljer de-googled varianten av e/OS/ (utmärkt val av android distro anser jag).> >> >> F-droid nämner det i... appen? Eller på sin sida att den fortfarande kommer fungera på t.ex. GrapheneOS och andra de-googled android ROMs.> >> >> MvH, Emilio Müller >> >> 1 Apr 2026 10:21:12 Name via Listan <listan(a)lists.dfri.se>: >> >> >>> Hej allihop >>> För de av Er som inte redan sett det har Google:s kontroll över Android telefoner tilltagit rejält. Se själva på till exempel:https://keepandroidopen.org/ >>> Om jag tolkar detta rätt innebär detta att för alla Android telefoner som har Google:s variant av androidoperativ (nästan alla) inte längre har rätten att installera fritt utvecklade apk:er som Google anser uteslutna. Appar från F-droid blir därmed uteslutna. Det verkar gå att runda det med rätt stora ingrepp som de flesta inte kommer att göra. Jag undrar hur det kommer funka med e/OS och väsentliga appar som bankid? Idag hämtar jag i e/OS dessa från app lounge i anonymt läge. Någon som vet hur "ringarna på vattnet" kommer påverka? >>> Det ligger nära till hands att appen "Signal" är i fara för den breda allmänheten även om den finns i google play. Google play verkar ha makten att ta bort den. Någon som har en annan tolkning och kan rätta mig. >>> >>> /Niclas Jacobsson >>> https://keepandroidopen.org/ >>> -- >>> Säkrad med Tuta Mail: >>> https://tuta.com/free-email >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Listan mailing list -- listan(a)lists.dfri.se >>> To unsubscribe send an email to listan-leave(a)lists.dfri.se >>>

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Sverige-id
by Folke Hermansson Snickars 02 Apr '26

02 Apr '26

Med anledning av Polisens uppdrag att utveckla en ny e-legitimation på högsta säkerhetsnivå diskuterade vi i eleg-gruppen om hur den nya legimentationen skulle komma att utformas. Speicellt noterade vi det som sägs om användningen: "När du har ansökt och fått ditt id-kort med Sverige-id använder du e-legitimationen genom en app på mobiltelefonen." Jag nämnde då en amerikansk förebild som finns i Utah och som liknar det som DFRI-projektet diskuterar. Här finns en detaljerad argumentation som Iain Henderson framför: https://hendersoni.substack.com/p/utah-digital-identity-bill-of-right?utm_s… https://polisen.se/aktuellt/nyheter/nationell/2026/mars/polismyndigheten-ut…

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Kontrollen tilltar
by Name 01 Apr '26

01 Apr '26

Hej allihop För de av Er som inte redan sett det har Google:s kontroll över Android telefoner tilltagit rejält. Se själva på till exempel:https://keepandroidopen.org/ Om jag tolkar detta rätt innebär detta att för alla Android telefoner som har Google:s variant av androidoperativ (nästan alla) inte längre har rätten att installera fritt utvecklade apk:er som Google anser uteslutna. Appar från F-droid blir därmed uteslutna. Det verkar gå att runda det med rätt stora ingrepp som de flesta inte kommer att göra. Jag undrar hur det kommer funka med e/OS och väsentliga appar som bankid? Idag hämtar jag i e/OS dessa från app lounge i anonymt läge. Någon som vet hur "ringarna på vattnet" kommer påverka? Det ligger nära till hands att appen "Signal" är i fara för den breda allmänheten även om den finns i google play. Google play verkar ha makten att ta bort den. Någon som har en annan tolkning och kan rätta mig. /Niclas Jacobsson https://keepandroidopen.org/ -- Säkrad med Tuta Mail: https://tuta.com/free-email

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Fw: URGENT CALL TO ACTION: Stop the anti-democratic "Chat Control" re-vote – Expose the Lobby Propaganda! (Votes: Wed 25th & Thu 26th)
by uvdfri 24 Mar '26

24 Mar '26

Det finns en mall som är enkel att använda samt kontaktuppgifter på fightchatcontrol.eu. Tidigare har det gjort skillnad i frågan när vi, dvs du och jag och flera som vi i EU, har kontaktat parlamentariker och andra. Ulrika ------- Forwarded Message ------- Från: BREYER Patrick via DFRI-intern <dfri-intern(a)lists.dfri.se> Datum: Den tisdag 24 mars 2026 kl. 07:09 Ämne: URGENT CALL TO ACTION: Stop the anti-democratic "Chat Control" re-vote – Expose the Lobby Propaganda! (Votes: Wed 25th & Thu 26th) Till: dfri(a)dfri.se <dfri(a)dfri.se> > Dear friends, > > We are facing a democratic emergency regarding the EU CSA Regulation (ePrivacy derogation / Chat Control): > > Just weeks ago, the European Parliament bravely adopted a position rejecting indiscriminate chat control mass surveillance of private messages. However, in an obscure and bizarre procedural move, the conservative EPP group in the European Parliament are attempting to force a re-vote to undo this brilliant work. > > Why is this happening? Because MEPs are currently buckling under an unprecedented, highly coordinated barrage of lobby propaganda. An unholy alliance of Big Tech, law enforcement agencies, and industry-/government-funded child protection groups has manufactured a false panic to force mass surveillance through the back door. > > We have just hours to counter this massive lobbying effort. The Parliament will vote twice this week: tomorrow (25th) and Thursday (26th). > > 🗣️ THE CORE MESSAGE TO MEPs > > The legislative process is intentionally confusing right now. Give MEPs these exact, simple voting instructions: > > - VOTE 1 - Wednesday (25th): VOTE IN FAVOR of motion to remove the vote from the agenda. This motion dictates that the Parliament should not vote again on the ePrivacy derogation. The Parliament has already agreed on a democratic position earlier this month. Reopening it makes a mockery of the democratic process. > - VOTE 2 - Thursday (26th): If Wednesday's motion fails, DEFEND PRIVACY. MEPs must maintain their original stance: scanning measures must be fully targeted (amendment 35). > > WHAT YOU CAN DO RIGHT NOW > > - Contact MEPs: Tell them to respect the Parliament’s original [11 March position](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0070_EN.html). Use and share the tool fightchatcontrol.eu to easily find MEP email addresses. > - Generate Media Attention: Issue press releases, contact tech/political journalists, and explicitly expose this attempt to undermine a democratic vote through corporate and police lobbying. > - Use Direct Channels: If you or your organization have direct, personal contacts with MEPs or their staff, call or message them. > > 📢 AMPLIFY ON SOCIAL MEDIA: REPOST & SHARE > > To cut through the lobby noise, we need massive public visibility. Please repost, share, and raise awareness on your social media channels today. > > ⚡ QUICK SHARE: Please immediately repost these urgent alerts on your channels: > > - 🐦 X (Twitter): [Share this Post](https://x.com/echo_pbreyer/status/2035296556857839956) > - 🦋 Bluesky: [Share the Alert](https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:qy2on5whae2qztxkx2jpzgkk/post/3mhkrrajyoyd2) > - 🐘 Mastodon: [Boost the call for action](https://digitalcourage.social/@echo_pbreyer/116266597665909346) > When drafting your own posts: > > - Direct citizens to action: Share the link fightchatcontrol.eu so the public can directly and easily email their MEPs. > - Boost the counter-narrative: Share the facts exposing the lobby network. A great starting point is [this expose thread](https://digitalcourage.social/@echo_pbreyer/116205371224315359). > > ⚠️ KNOW YOUR ENEMY: EXPOSING THE LOBBY PROPAGANDA > > To effectively counter their narrative, you must know what MEPs are being fed. Here is the propaganda currently flooding MEPs. Use these links in your press releases and social media to expose their coordinated panic-mongering: > > - Big Tech & Industry: > > - Google: Pushing for derogation to avoid privacy compliance: [Google Policy Blog](https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/public-policy/eu-lawmakers-must-act-now-to-ensure-the-continued-protection-of-children/) > - DOTEurope: Directly supporting the EPP's push for surveillance: [LinkedIn Post 1](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/doteurope_policymakers-across-the-politic… | [LinkedIn Post 2](https://www.linkedin.com/posts/doteurope_it-might-sound-unbelievable-but… > > - Law Enforcement: Police unions and agencies are pushing authoritarian framing. > > - BKA President: [Warning in Die Zeit](https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2026-03/bka-sexueller-missbrauch-kinder-jugendliche-warnung-chatkontrolle-ausnahme-endet-gxe) > - Police Union (GdP): [Press Statement](https://www.gdp.de/bund/de/stories/2026/03/polizei-muss-befaehigt-werden-gdp-warnt-vor-auslaufen-der-csam-ausnahmeregelung) > > - Industry-Funded NGOs: > > - IWF: [Statement claiming "children at risk"](https://www.iwf.org.uk/news-media/statements/eu-failure-on-temporary-derogation-puts-children-at-risk/) > - ECLAG: [Reaction to Trialogue breakdown](https://childsafetyineurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ECLAG… > > 🛡️ AMMUNITION: DEBUNKING THEIR LIES > > - The "Blame Game" Lie: EU governments are publicly blaming the Parliament for negotiations falling apart. This is false. [This recent report from Netzpolitik](https://netzpolitik.org/2026/verlaengerung-der-ausnahmeregelun… proves the Council knowingly and deliberately let negotiations fail because they refused to compromise. > - The "Tech is Safe" Lie: Proponents claim their scanning tools are precise. Point to [this brand-new study from KU Leuven scientists](https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/pseudodna/) exposing the severe "structural weaknesses" and flaws in PhotoDNA’s CSAM scanning. > > 📎 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FOR REFERENCE > > For your policy teams, here are the official links regarding Thursday's agenda and voting: > > - Agenda for Thursday: [Link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/OJQ-10-2026-03-26_EN.html#V-29) > - Voting List: [Link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sedcms/votingList/(A10-0040_2026)_Sippel.pdf) > - Amendments (29-36) to be voted on: [Link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040_EN.html) > > Please help now. Let's not let Big Tech and mass-surveillance advocates perpetuate Chat Control the phasing out of which is within reach. > > Best regards, > > Patrick > > My latest press release: > > The Battle Over Chat Control: How EU Governments and the Tech Lobby Are Trying to Overturn Parliament's Vote — A Comprehensive Fact Check > > This week, the European Parliament faces a decisive vote on whether the indiscriminate scanning of private chats and emails by US tech companies (Chat Control 1.0) will be allowed to continue. After Parliament [voted](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/historic-chat-control-vote-in-the-eu-parliament-meps-vote-to-end-untargeted-mass-scanning-of-private-chats/) on 11 March to replace blanket mass surveillance with targeted monitoring of suspects — thereby protecting the confidentiality of digital correspondence — EU member state governments let the trilogue negotiations fail by refusing to compromise in substance. > > Now, in an unprecedented manoeuvre, the conservative EPP group is attempting to force a [repeat vote](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/OJQ-10-2026-03-26_EN.html#V-29) on Thursday (26 March) to overturn the Parliament's principled decision and keep indiscriminate chat scanning in place. A preliminary vote on Wednesday will determine whether this repeat vote goes ahead or is struck from the agenda. > > Digital rights expert and former MEP Patrick Breyer outlines the urgently needed change of strategy: > >> "Indiscriminate Chat Control is like trying to mop up water while the faucet is still running. It is technologically obsolete and a proven failure in criminal justice terms. Flooding our police forces each year with hundreds of thousands of hits from unreliable US algorithms — most of them either false positives or long-known duplicates — does not rescue a single child from ongoing abuse. This data deluge ties up massive resources that are desperately needed for undercover investigations into actual abuse networks. To genuinely protect children online, we need a paradigm shift: providers must be required to prevent cybergrooming through safe app design and strict default settings. Illegal material on the open internet and darknet must be proactively tracked down and removed at source. That is what truly protects children." > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Background: What exactly expires on 3 April > > An EU interim regulation (2021/1232), set to expire on 3 April, currently permits US corporations such as Meta to carry out indiscriminate mass scanning of private messages on a voluntary basis. Three types of chat control are authorised: scanning for already known images and videos (so-called hash scanning, which generates over 90% of reports); automated assessment of previously unknown images and videos; and automated analysis of text content in private chats. > > The AI-based analysis of unknown images and texts is extremely error-prone. But the indiscriminate mass scanning for known material — [proposed by socialists and liberals](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040-AM-030-031_EN.pdf) — is highly controversial, too: beyond the [unreliability of the algorithms documented by researchers](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/486), these scans rely on opaque foreign databases rather than European criminal law. The algorithms are blind to context and lack of criminal intent (e.g. consensual sexting between teenagers). As a result, vast numbers of private but criminally irrelevant chats are exposed. > > In the run-up to the vote, US tech corporations, foreign-funded lobby groups, and law enforcement agencies are flooding public discourse with warnings about an alleged "legal gap." A comparison of their claims with internal documents, scientific studies, and the voices of child protection experts and actual abuse survivors, however, reveals an entirely different picture. > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Disinformation Narratives of Chat Control Proponents — and the Facts > > Disinformation 1: "The European Parliament is to blame for the collapse of negotiations and is putting children at risk." > (Claimed by the [lobby alliance ECLAG](https://childsafetyineurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ECLAG-Rea… and [US tech companies](https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/public-policy/eu-lawmakers-must-act-now-to-ensure-the-continued-protection-of-children/)) > > - Fact: It was the EU Council of Ministers that deliberately let the trilogue negotiations fail, for tactical reasons. > - Evidence: [Leaked Council cables, classified as restricted](https://netzpolitik.org/2026/verlaengerung-der-ausnahmeregelung…, reveal that EU member states showed no willingness to compromise, fearing that any concession could set a precedent for the permanent Chat Control 2.0 regulation. The classified minutes from 13 March show that the Cypriot Presidency already anticipated failure before the final trilogue round, noting it did "not expect to reach an agreement" with the lack of a new mandate given by member states. A majority including Hungary, Belgium, Sweden, Spain, Latvia, Slovakia, Malta, Estonia, Slovenia, Romania and Germany were unwilling to make any concessions on scope. Only a small minority of governments including France and Ireland agreed to the Presidency's proposal to phase out at least the most error-prone text scanning in search of "grooming". The Netherlands showed itself "completely flexible", and Italy had long before [criticised](https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5792-2026-ADD-1/en/pdf) the scope of scans and demanded "prior authorization of detection activities by [public] authorities". > - Parliament's lead negotiator, Birgit Sippel (S&D), [sharply criticised the Council](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260316IPR38230/child-sexual-abuse-online-statement-by-rapporteur-on-extending-temporary-rules) after the breakdown: "with their lack of flexibility, Member States have deliberately accepted that the interim regulation will expire in April." > > Disinformation 2: "Without indiscriminate Chat Control, law enforcement will be flying blind." > (Claimed by law enforcement officials across the EU) > > - Fact: Targeted telecommunications surveillance based on concrete suspicion and a judicial warrant remains fully available after 3 April, as does the bulk scanning of public posts and hosted files. User reports also remain possible. The real problem for authorities is a flood of false leads and a systemic refusal to remove material from the internet. > - Evidence — investigative chaos: According to Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), nearly 50% of chat control reports are criminally irrelevant. This flood of data waste ties up massive resources desperately needed for targeted, undercover investigations into real abuse networks. Where investigations are opened, German crime statistics show that around 40% of suspects are minors themselves, often acting without criminal intent or in consensual situations. The [Federation of German Criminal Investigators (BDK) warns](https://www.bdk.de/der-bdk/was-wir-tun/aktuelles/keine-massenueberwachung-unter-dem-deckmantel-des-kinderschutzes) that this mass surveillance produces "a flood of tips… often without any actual investigative lead." Meanwhile, Europol and German authorities systematically refuse to proactively have abuse material removed from the internet, as [investigative reporting by ARD/STRG_F has revealed](https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr/innenminister-darstellung-sexualisierter-gewalt-gegen-kinder-100.html) — images and videos remain online despite authorities being fully able to have them taken down, even as they demand ever more surveillance powers. > - Evidence — failure to protect children: Mass scanning for already known images does not stop ongoing abuse and does not rescue children in acute danger. According to the European Commission's own [evaluation report](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/chat-control-evaluation-report-eu-commission-again-fails-to-demonstrate-effectiveness-of-mass-surveillance-of-intimate-personal-photos-and-videos/), no measurable link can be established between the mass surveillance of private messages and actual convictions. Yet the Commission and Council demand the extension of a measure whose effectiveness they themselves cannot demonstrate. > - Evidence — risk of annulment in court: The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) [stresses](https://www.edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-releases/2026/extension-interim-rules-combat-child-sexual-abuse-online-must-address-shortcomings-and-prevent-indiscriminate-scanning_en) that any solution used to detect illegal content must be targeted and not indiscriminate. The Council's own legal service [concluded](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/st08787.en23-leak.pdf) in 2023 concerning the proposal for a permanent regulation (CSAR): "the detection order regime provided for by the proposed Regulation as regards interpersonal communications entails a serious risk that it would be found to compromise the essence of the rights to privacy and data protection enshrined in Article 7 and 8 of the Charter, in so far as it would seek to authorise access on a generalised basis, through automated and systemic screening surveillance, to the content of electronic communications and personal data of all users of a specific service, irrespective of their direct or indirect link with child sexual abuse criminal activities" (para 58) > > Disinformation 3: "The scanning technology deployed is highly precise and protects privacy." > (Claimed by [Meta, Google, Microsoft, Snap, TikTok](https://blog.google/company-news/outreach-and-initiatives/public-policy/eu-lawmakers-must-act-now-to-ensure-the-continued-protection-of-children/)) > > - Fact: The technology is an ineffective legacy system, error-prone, and destructive to the security of private communications. > - Evidence — an obsolete model: Offenders can effortlessly switch to secure messengers where no chat control takes place. Due to the increasing adoption of end-to-end encryption by providers, the number of chats reported to police has already dropped by 50% since 2022. Most recently, only [36%](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52025DC0740) of reports from US companies originated from the chat control of private messages, while social media platforms and cloud storage services are becoming increasingly relevant. Rather than investing in targeted investigative work, the Council clings to a dying surveillance model. > - Evidence — unreliability: A [recent international research paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/486) documents the structural weaknesses of the industry standard PhotoDNA. The software is unreliable: criminals can make illegal images invisible through minimal alterations (e.g. adding a border), while innocent citizens can easily be falsely flagged. In a [November 2025 open letter, leading IT researchers](https://csa-scientist-open-letter.org/Nov2025) (including from the universities of Aarhus, Leuven, and ETH Zurich) warned: "False positives seem unavoidable." According to an [open letter by a coalition of more than 40 civil liberties organisations and professional associations](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/We-say-no-to-Big-… (including Europe's leading digital rights groups), the Commission's own evaluation report confirms the measure's failure: the US algorithms deployed show error rates of 13 to 20 percent. Of the billions of messages scanned, only 0.0000027 percent were actually illegal material. > > Disinformation 4: "The call for Chat Control comes primarily from victims and civil society." > (Suggested by the [ECLAG campaign](https://childsafetyineurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ECLAG-…) > > - Fact: Actual survivors are taking legal action against Chat Control. The real driving force behind the campaign is a network of tech companies and lobby organisations funded by governments and non-European foundations. > - Evidence — survivors speak out: Survivors of sexualised violence are fighting back. Alexander Hanff, a survivor and privacy advocate, [writes](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-i-dont-support-privacy-invasive-…: "As a survivor, I depend on confidential communication to find support and report crimes. Taking away our right to privacy means further harming us." Dorothée Hahne of the [survivors' association MOGIS e.V. warns](https://mogis-verein.de/static/media/uploads/eu_efa-greens-speech-mogis-hahne-28032022-en.pdf): "We see our safe spaces destroyed." To preserve safe spaces for victims, [a survivor from Bavaria is currently suing](https://freiheitsrechte.org/en/themen/freiheit-im-digitalen-zeitalte… with the support of the Society for Civil Rights (GFF) against Meta's scanning of his chats. The civil society coalition also [warns](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/We-say-no-to-Big-Tech-ma… that indiscriminate scanning dangerously undermines professional confidentiality for lawyers, doctors, and therapists. > - Evidence — lobbying: Who truly benefits from this legislation was exposed in an [investigative report by Balkan Insight](https://balkaninsight.com/2023/09/25/who-benefits-inside-the-eus-f…. The US organisation Thorn, which sells scanning software to public authorities, invests hundreds of thousands of euros annually in EU lobbying. ECLAG members [are supported](https://digitalcourage.social/@echo_pbreyer/116205371224315359) by tech corporations and the non-European Oak Foundation. > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > > The Alternative to Surveillance Overreach: "Security by Design" > > The European Parliament [advocates](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/posts/chat-control/#epmandate) a genuine paradigm shift, supported by civil society, survivor networks, and IT security experts: instead of indiscriminate mass surveillance of private communications using error-prone US algorithms, chat and messaging services should be "Secure by Design." This includes: > > - Strict default settings and protective mechanisms (Security by Design) to make cybergrooming technically harder from the outset and prevent the creation of CSAM. > - Targeted telecommunications surveillance based on judicially confirmed suspicion. > - Proactive search by a new EU Center and immediate takedown obligations for providers and law enforcement on the open internet and darknet — removing illegal material at source. > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > > Call to Action > > Civil liberties advocates are urging citizens across Europe to contact their MEPs directly ahead of the decisive votes on Wednesday and Thursday. Through the campaign page fightchatcontrol.eu, MEPs can be called upon to reject the undemocratic motion for a repeat vote and to uphold the fundamental right to confidential correspondence. > > Breyer warns: > >> "When a democratic decision is put to a vote repeatedly until the desired outcome is achieved, Parliament itself is devalued. This approach sets a dangerous precedent. It undermines the reliability of democratic processes and sends the signal that majorities only count when they are politically convenient. The responsible actors are damaging not only trust in the European institutions, but the very foundations of democracy." > > On Tuesday, EU governments [will strategise](https://www.parlament.gv.at/dokument/XXVIII/EU/64047/imfname_11593678.pdf) in a restricted format and behind closed doors on the issue. > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------

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Fw: [Styrelse] Interview request - ATTRACT Project
by uvdfri 24 Mar '26

24 Mar '26

Hej! Finns det någon medlem på listan som är intresserad och vill delta i en intervju om RightToRepair? Svara gärna Ana! I mina ögon är detta också en viktig rättighet, att kunna få våra digitala prylar att fungera och inte bli inlåsta i jättarnas handklovar. Ulrika / Styrelsen ------- Forwarded Message ------- Från: ATTRACT <attract(a)uvigo.gal> Datum: Den torsdag 12 februari 2026 kl. 17:06 Ämne: [Styrelse] Interview request - ATTRACT Project Till: styrelse(a)dfri.se <styrelse(a)dfri.se>, dfri(a)dfri.se <dfri(a)dfri.se> > Dear DFRI, > > My name is Ana, and I am part of the ATTRACT research project at the University of Vigo (Spain). ATTRACT is an academic project coordinated by Mario Pansera and Javier Lloveras (ORCID: [0000-0002-3806-1381](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3806-1381) and [0000-0002-7780-9380](https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7780-9380)), focused on the Right to Repair (R2R) movement (more information: https://postgrowth-lab.uvigo.es/projects/attract/). > > We are contacting you because of your participation in the Right to Repair Europe network, and we would be grateful for the opportunity to interview a representative (or representatives) from your organization. The aim is to better understand your work, priorities, and on-the-ground experience related to R2R, as well as the main challenges and opportunities you see in this area. > > Participation would involve a 30–40 minutes online interview, scheduled at your convenience. With your permission, we may audio-record the interview to ensure accuracy. The interview data will be used only for research purposes and accessed only by the research team. In any publications or outputs, we will not attribute quotes or information to you or your organization without your explicit consent (and we can anonymize contributions if you prefer). > > Your input will help us develop research-based outputs (e.g., policy briefs and practice-oriented briefs) and prepare a Social Repairability Forum with local actors, ensuring that discussions reflect real priorities and constraints in the R2R field. We will also share our findings in a final report with participants. > > Please find the Participant Information Sheet attached. If you are open to taking part, we would be happy to propose a few time slots, or you can suggest times that work best for you. > > Thank you very much for your time and consideration. > > Best regards, > > ATTRACT team > > A Right to a Repair Society: Controversies, Opportunities and Challenges > > https://postgrowth-lab.uvigo.es/ > > [Forma > > Descripción generada automáticamente con confianza media] > > [Casa con relleno sólido] > > Benito Corbal 45, 5th floor. 36001 Pontevedra (Spain) > > [Icono, Receptor Del Teléfono, Teléfono] > > +34 986 81 87 41 > > https://postgrowth-lab.uvigo.es/ > > postgrowth-lab.uvigo.es/projects/attract/ > > https://twitter.com/post_growth > > [@post_growth](https://twitter.com/post_growth) > > https://www.linkedin.com/company/postgrowth-lab > > [postgrowth-lab](https://www.linkedin.com/company/postgrowth-lab)

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DFRI Styrelsemöte 26 mars 18:00 (fysiskt) och After Work
by uvdfri 24 Mar '26

24 Mar '26

DFRI håller ett öppet fysiskt styrelsemöte torsdag 26 mars kl 18:00. Vi beräknas hålla på i ungefär en timme. Alla medlemmar och andra intresserade är välkomna. Därefter stannar vi som vill för fortsatta samtal och umgänge. Plats: Bryggeripuben Munkbron i Gamla Stan, Lilla Nygatan 2, https://www.munkbron.com (Vi kommer antagligen att vara i valven i källaren). Vi lägger ut en DFRI-skylt och/eller klistermärken så hittar ni oss. Agendan hittar du här, den kommer att uppdateras fram till mötets start. https://cryptpad.fr/pad/#/2/pad/view/RPsZ4zxypW2F2wuugmv8A4R+exCKo1nIgVGTZD… Anmäl dig gärna per mejl till dfri(a)dfri.se eller direkt till styrelse(a)dfri.se så att vi vet hur många som kommer. I ditt mejl kan du även föreslå saker som du vill ska tas upp på mötet. Välkommen!

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Angående fråga Meta glasögon
by uvdfri 09 Mar '26

09 Mar '26

Lilla jag mot Meta, stor chans... men jag tänker att om en person hos en återförsäljare börjar tycka att det är en oskön pryl att sälja så har jag gjort någonting. Och jag har åtminstone sagt något till någon. Delar mitt brev till Synsam och Synoptik. Inväntar svar och ska försöka formulera ett klagomål/tips till IMY. Oavsett om de gör något eller inte så finns det ändå någon som sagt att denna produkt är fel. Jag kan och vill inte stoppa teknikutvecklingen, men det finns ett moraliskt ansvar vad man väljer att sälja i sin butik. ------- Forwarded Message ------- Från: uvdfri <uvdfri(a)proton.me> Datum: Den fredag 6 mars 2026 kl. 13:19 Ämne: Re: [5375711] Angående fråga Meta glasögon Till: Synsam Kundservice <customerservice(a)synsam.se> > Hej! > Tack för vänligt bemötande. > > Jag är mycket, mycket bekymrad över Synsams (och även andra kedjor, de får detta också) beslut att sälja och marknadsföra Metas spionglasögon "smarta glasögon". > > Dessa glasögon, till skillnad från en telefon, kan obemärkt filma och spela in mig och andra människor på gatan, i gymmet, i bastun, i skolan, på mitt arbete, under en date eller tillfälligt möte. Den lilla led-lampan som ska visa filmning går enkelt att modifiera för att inte lysa och är så liten att den är svår att upptäcka t.ex på en buss. Eller på ett gym. > > Inspelningarna laddas upp till Metas AI-platform (eftersom glasögonens smarta funktioner inte fungerar utan dessa) och även utan AI så är det inte många användare som tar sig den krångliga vägen att försöka ställa in att inspelningar inte laddas upp direkt. Det är svårt att ens veta vad som laddas upp och inte. (se SvD granskning nedan) > > Som mötande på gatan, eller i gymmet, har jag ingen chans att säga nej till att bli inspelad, för jag vet inte ens om det. Att be en person ta ner sin telefon är ganska enkelt. Att be alla personer på bussen eller i gymmet att ta av sig sina glasögon är orimligt. Jag kan inte skydda mig. > > Det betyder att ni säljer en spionprodukt, som mycket lätt kan missbrukas och fånga många människor på film som inte godkänt det. > > Att det lagliga ansvaret ligger på er kund, är visserligen sant vad jag vet. Dvs ni står fria från åtal. MEN ni kan inte undvika det moraliska ansvaret att tillgängliggöra denna produkt. > > "Men kunderna efterfrågar dessa" är sannolikt ett svar. > Ja, kunderna kan också efterfråga glasögon med giftpilar i. Kommer ni sälja dem också? (om det var lagligt)? > > "Om inte vi säljer dem så kommer alla andra sälja, och det innebär en stor affärsrisk om inte vi är med på tåget" är sannolikt också ett svar. > Ja, om era konkurrenter börjar sälja glasögon med giftpilar i, kommer ni sälja dem också? > Det skulle t.om kunna vara så att Synsam fick ett bättre rykte om ni avstod från att sälja detta extremt integritetskränkande inspelningsverktyg. > > Kunder som går omkring med dessa glasögon kan inte bara filma sina dejter och familj, tjejer eller hatobjekt på gymmet, på jobbet och i skolan. De kan också lätt fånga många människor på film som är på flykt från regimer som t.ex Iran, Kina, Ryssland och riskerar att dö av att dessa filmer finns tillgängliga i Metas datacenter. > > Jag ber er vänligen att: > > - Ta bort denna farliga och kränkande produkt ur sortimentet > - Uppmuntra andra i branschen att göra detsamma > - Svara på min fråga om - hur ska jag skydda mig mot att bli filmad? Med dessa glasögon på marknaden när jag är på stan, på en bar eller på ett jobb-möte med människor jag inte känner? (Led-ljuset hjälper inte eftersom det går att avaktivera) > > Här finns några artiklar i ämnet. SvD är bakom betalvägg, men eftersom den handlar om er så kan ni säkert få tillgång till den om ni ber deras pressavdelning eller reportern. > > https://www.svd.se/a/5pBKne/imy-efter-avslojande-om-metas-smarta-glasogon-v… > > https://www.svd.se/a/RjrEW5/meta-smarta-glasogon-filmar-facebook-agaren-gra… > > https://axbom.se/meta-glasogon-sverige/ > > https://www.404media.co/whats-the-difference-between-ai-glasses-and-an-ipho… > > https://www.404media.co/metas-ray-ban-glasses-users-film-and-harass-massage… > > Vänligen, > Ulrika, Stockholm > > Den fredag 6 mars 2026 kl. 12:56, Synsam Kundservice <customerservice(a)synsam.se> skrev: > >> Hej Ulrika. >> >> Tack för ett trevligt samtal! >> >> Svara på det här mejlet med din fråga angående Meta glasögonen så ska jag se till att du får svar. >> >> Ha en fin dag! >> >> Vennlig hilsen/Vänliga hälsningar/Best regards, >> >> Belinda >> >> Telefon: 08 - 400 50 450 >> >> E-mail: customerservice(a)synsam.se >> >> [www.synsamgroup.com](https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=ht… [www.synsam.se](https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%… >> >> https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.synsam… >> >> ["Ursprunglig URL: https://www.facebook.com/synsam.se/?locale=sv_SE. Klicka eller tryck om du har förtroende för den här länken."](https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.facebook.com%2Fsynsam.se%2F%3Flocale%3Dsv_SE&data=05%7C02%7Cmartin.larsson%40synsam.com%7C9dc635ace65a45710def08de31a1281f%7C7382871a85e74da59d5323c46c77d36c%7C0%7C0%7C639002765824972410%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=GFbJs1whSh50TsjFx4myFPaMYvex1hcJtCopIgdV%2BEU%3D&reserved=0)["Ursprunglig URL: https://www.instagram.com/synsamsverige/?hl=sv. Klicka eller tryck om du har förtroende för den här länken."](https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.instagram.com%2Fsynsamsverige%2F%3Fhl%3Dsv&data=05%7C02%7Cmartin.larsson%40synsam.com%7C9dc635ace65a45710def08de31a1281f%7C7382871a85e74da59d5323c46c77d36c%7C0%7C0%7C639002765824997697%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=sePfSH4Nb%2BtbLFTj%2FdOXc1DCbf8sM4Lbnfreqa8r7nY%3D&reserved=0)["Ursprunglig URL: https://www.linkedin.com/company/synsam-group/. Klicka eller tryck om du har förtroende för den här länken."](https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.linkedin.com%2Fcompany%2Fsynsam-group%2F&data=05%7C02%7Cmartin.larsson%40synsam.com%7C9dc635ace65a45710def08de31a1281f%7C7382871a85e74da59d5323c46c77d36c%7C0%7C0%7C639002765825019969%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=%2BRQkUiu0PsdFDtIKslHiR2h0dQSjceCKQxgUleJAfRI%3D&reserved=0)["Ursprunglig URL: https://www.youtube.com/@synsamgroup1400. Klicka eller tryck om du har förtroende för den här länken."](https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2F%40synsamgroup1400&data=05%7C02%7Cmartin.larsson%40synsam.com%7C9dc635ace65a45710def08de31a1281f%7C7382871a85e74da59d5323c46c77d36c%7C0%7C0%7C639002765825043237%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJFbXB0eU1hcGkiOnRydWUsIlYiOiIwLjAuMDAwMCIsIlAiOiJXaW4zMiIsIkFOIjoiTWFpbCIsIldUIjoyfQ%3D%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&sdata=skaL5o0if2FVcvZjUA33Jf%2Ba0qw8hhK3uYktLTG0ENU%3D&reserved=0) >> >> https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.synsam… >> >> https://eur02.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.synsam…

2 1

Chat Control 1 och 2 vad händer? Samt förslaget
by uvdfri 04 Mar '26

04 Mar '26

Hej, Att sammanfatta vad som händer i EU gällande Chat Control 1 och 2 är inte helt enkelt. Här är en uppdatering från femtejuli-stiftelsen, se även uppdateringen på inlägget. https://femtejuli.se/2026/03/03/parlamentsutskott-sager-nej-till-chat-contr… Patrick Breyer skriver också ett inlägg kopierat nedan. Här är det senaste ändringsförslaget till Chat Control 2 som jag har haft i mina loggor. Om någon känner till ett senare, posta gärna. https://cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2025/07/2025-07-24_Council_Presidency… Den som vill läsa och sätta sig in i innehållet är förstås mer än välkommen att dela sin sammanfattning. Många ögon behövs. Följ gärna chatcontrol.eu och chatcontrol.se och du kan även bidra till chatcontrol.se med länkningar till nyhetsuppdateringar till arkivet. Ulrika > PRESS RELEASE > > Bombshell in Brussels: Civil Liberties Committee Votes to Stop "Chat Control 1.0" – Sensational Vote Against Mass Surveillance > > In a historically rare turn of events, the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) [voted](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040_EN.html) Monday night against the Commission's proposal to extend the so-called "Chat Control 1.0" Regulation (EU) 2021/1232. This interim regulation, set to expire in April, allows providers of e-mail, messaging and chat services (such as Meta or Google) to indiscriminately scan the private chats and emails of millions of citizens for potentially illegal content. > > By a [vote of 38 to 28](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/303623/Vote%20results_2%20March%202026.pdf) (with 3 abstentions), MEPs delivered a resounding rejection of indiscriminate mass surveillance of private messages. The rejection was carried by a broad but heterogeneous coalition: Committee members from the EPP (Christian Democrats), Greens, The Left, the majority of the Renew group (Liberals), and the far-right ESN voted against the draft report while the Social Democrats (S&D) voted in favor, supported by the national-conservative ECR and the far-right PfE group. > > Patrick Breyer, digital freedom fighter and former Member of the European Parliament for the Pirate Party, comments: > >> "What a sensational milestone: The digital privacy of correspondence is alive! There is no majority for indiscriminate mass scanning of our private chats. A thousand thanks to everyone who applied pressure beforehand. The final showdown follows next week at the plenary vote." > > The Vote Result: No Majority for Indiscriminate Chat Control > > The committee rejected all attempts to further legitimize the temporary derogation allowing for the mass, indiscriminate scanning of private chats, which is set to expire in April 2026. None of the political camps could secure a majority for their approach: > > - FAILED: The proposal by Rapporteur Birgit Sippel (S&D), which sought to drop error-prone AI text scanning and automated classification of unknown visuals but proposed to continue indiscriminate mass control via "hash scanning" (matching against databases), failed to reach a majority with a tie of 33:33 votes. The criticism: Scanning for already known images does not stop ongoing abuse nor rescue children. > - FAILED: The Conservatives' demand to allow even less reliable AI analysis of never-before-seen images and chat histories also found no majority. This is the approach adopted by EU governments in Council. > - FAILED: The fundamental rights-compliant proposal by the Greens and Pirates to restrict scans strictly to individuals connected by law enforcement to child sexual abuse was also not adopted. > > As a result, the LIBE Committee [recommends](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-10-2026-0040_EN.html) that the EU Parliament rejects the Commission proposal. It is expected, however, that all alternative approaches listed above will be put to a vote again in the plenary session next week – the outcome is completely open. > > Lobbying Myths Debunked > > Industry associations and proponents are currently trying to pressure MEPs with the claim that the scans are "voluntary" and "high-precision" (see [tech industry lobbying paper](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DOT-Europe-Open-letter-on-extension-of-ePrivacy-derogation.pdf)). The reality is different: > > - Mass False Suspicion: There is no such thing as "high precision" in mass hash scanning. When searching for "known" material, opaque international databases often fail to account for European criminal law. Furthermore, algorithms are blind to context and lack of intent (e.g., acting out of outrage, misguided humor, misjudging age, or teenage sexting). The consequence: The German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) reports that almost half of all reported chats (approx. 150,000 per year) are criminally irrelevant. This floods authorities with false positives and ties up resources urgently needed to investigate producers and abuse perpetrators. Automated analysis of unknown visuals or the text of chat conversations is even less reliable. > - Criminalization of Minors: Instead of catching predators, algorithms increasingly criminalize minors. In Germany, 40% of proceedings already target teenagers sharing "embarrassing" or sexually explicit content (sexting) among themselves, without any abusive intent. > - Coercion via Backdoor: The alleged "voluntary nature" of the providers is effectively a standard that hardly any major US service evades. In the future, providers are to be explicitly obliged to implement "risk mitigation" measures. > > No "Legal Vacuum," but a Chance for Real Security > > The argument by proponents that letting the regulation expire would lead to a dangerous "legal vacuum" and leave police "blind" is misleading fear-mongering: > > - Public Web Still Scanned: Providers remain permitted to scan public posts, hosted files, and websites without this special regulation regarding private communication. User reports also remain permissible. Suspicious activity reports to the police will therefore continue. > - Encryption is Coming Anyway: Indiscriminate mass surveillance is a dying model. Major services like Meta are increasingly shifting to end-to-end encryption, where these scans are technically impossible. > - Quality over Quantity: Ending error-prone mass scans would relieve authorities of the flood of "junk data" and free up capacity for targeted, undercover investigations. > The negotiations on the permanent Child Sexual Abuse Regulation (CSAR) are scheduled to conclude in Summer, thus new rules will soon be enacted. > > Why Mass Scans Fail and What We Need Instead > > Searching for a needle in the haystack of billions of private communications has proven ineffective. It drowns law enforcement in data garbage, while professional predator networks have long since moved to secure channels. > Instead of endlessly extending the failed "Chat Control 1.0", the EU needs to move on to the approach already outlined by the Parliament for the permanent regulation (CSAR): > > - Security by Design: Obliging services to implement safe default settings (e.g., protection against contact attempts by strangers/adults) rather than breaking the privacy of all users. > - Targeted Investigations: Surveillance must only occur upon reasonable suspicion and with a judicial order – focusing resources on actual perpetrators to protect children, prevent the production of new material and bust offender networks. > - Removing Instead of Scanning: Proactive cleaning of the public web and consistent removal obligations for illegal material to stop distribution at the source. > > Politics at a Crossroads > > Breyer concludes: > >> "EU governments in the Council are almost unanimously (except CZ) demanding an extension of privatised mass surveillance for two years, to pave the way for the permanent authorization of Chat Control during this time. The Parliament now has the historic chance to choose a new, truly effective and rights-respecting approach. We need targeted, judicially ordered surveillance in cases of suspicion and secure technology for everyone – not a permanent state of exception that places 450 million innocent citizens under general suspicion." > > Further Information & Documents: > > - [Industry Lobbying Paper](https://www.patrick-breyer.de/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/DOT-Europe-Open-letter-on-extension-of-ePrivacy-derogation.pdf) > - [Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)](https://www.edps.europa.eu/press-publications/press-news/press-releases/2026/extension-interim-rules-combat-child-sexual-abuse-online-must-address-shortcomings-and-prevent-indiscriminate-scanning_en) > - [Civil Society Open Lette](https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/We-say-no-to-Big-Tech-ma… > > Background Information: > https://chatcontrol.eu > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > > You are receiving this press release because you are on our contact list. To unsubscribe, please reply with "UNSUBSCRIBE" in the subject line. > > -- > Dr. Patrick Breyer > Former Member of the European Parliament for the German Pirate Party > E-Mail: > europa(a)patrick-breyer.de > My PGP key: > http://keys.gnupg.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x774EC7FD4E3C9B04

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